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Comments
FEDERAL COURT'S SUPERVISORY Powmn OvE

THE FEDERAL LAW

AGaENCss

Petitioner, in Rea v. United States,' was indicted for the unlawful acquisition
of marihuana in violation of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 United States Code,

1. 350 U.S. 214 (1956).

(298)
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section 2593 (a).' The indictment was based on evidence obtained by a search
warrant issued by a United States Commissioner, as authorized by Rule 41 (a)'
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.' The petitioner, Rea, moved pursuant to
Rule 41 (e)l to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search warrant was
improperly issued in that it was insufficient on its face, no probable cause
existed, and the affidavit was not based on sworn statements.' The motion to
suppress was granted and the indictment dismissed. The petitioner could not
recover the illegally obtained evidence from the government because it was contraband and not returnable.?

2. 26 U.S.C. §2593 (a): "It shall be unlawful for any person who is a transferee required to pay the transfer tax imposed by section 2590 (a) to acquire or
otherwise obtain any marihuana without having paid such tax; and proof that
any person shall have had in his possession any marihuana and shall have failed,
after reasonable notice and demand by the collector, to produce the order form
required by the section 2591 to be retained by him, shall be presumptive evidence
of guilt under this section and of liability for the tax imposed by section 2590
(a)."
3. FED. R. CRim. P. 41(a). "A search warrant authorized by this rule may
be issued by a judge of the United States or of a state or territorial court of
record or by a United States commissioner within the district wherein the property
sought is located."
4. 18 U.S.C.A. 461.
5. FED. R. CRimi. P. 41(e). "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property
was seized for the return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the property
seized is not that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause
for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or
(5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall receive evidence on any
issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted
the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and
it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. The motion
to suppress evidence may also be made in the district where the trial is to be had.
The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor
did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but
the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing."
6. FED. R. CRIm. P. 41(c) provides in relevant part as follows: "A warrant
shall issue only on affidavit sworn to before the judge or commissioner and
establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the judge or commissioner
is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause
to believe that they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the property
and naming or describing the person or place to be searched. The warrant shall
be directed to a civil officer the United States authorized to enforce or assist in
enforcing any law thereof or to a person so authorized by the President of the
United States. It shall state the grounds or probable cause for its issuance and
the names of the persons whose affidavits have been taken in support thereof.
'7. INT. Rnv. CODn, 28 U.S.C. § 2463, provides as follows: "All property taken
or detained under any revenue law of the United States shall not be repleviable,
but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the law and subject only to the
orders and decrees of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction thereof." Also see 26 U.S.C. §2698, 26 U.S.C.A. §2698.
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Subsequently a federal narcotics agent filed a complaint before a New
Mexico judge and caused the arrest of the petitioner. The petitioner was then
charged with being in possession of narcotics in violation of the New Mexico
narcotics law. The case against the petitioner in the New Mexico court is based
entirely on the testimony of the federal agent and the evidence which was
illegally seized pursuant to the faulty search warrant. The petitioner brought a
proceeding to enjoin the federal agent from testifing in the state court. The
district court denied the motion to enjoin and the court of appeals affirmed.
However, in a five to four decision by the United States Supreme Court, with
Justice Douglas writing the decision, it was decided that, pursuant to the federal
government's "supervisory powers over its federal law agencies", the Supreme
Court could and should prevent the federal agent from testifying in the New
Mexico state court. Justice Douglas said that there was no question of the interplay of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and that the district court was not asked to enjoin a state official from
testifying or in any way interfering with state agencies. He continued to say that
the only relief asked for was against a federal agent, and this could not be interpreted as either directly or indirectly interfering with the state authorities in
the administration of their state justice. Since the search and seizure of the
federal agent had not been made in the manner that is guaranteed by the fourth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, it was the duty of the federal
court to police the federal rules of procedure relating to search and seizure, and
to make certain that they were observed. This idea was expressed in the principal
case as follows:
To enjoin the federal agent from testifying merely to enforce the federal
rules against those owing obedience to them.'
The fact that there was a five to four decision shows that there is ample room
for disagreement as to the propriety of the theories of and result reached by the
majority. It is the purpose of the writer to discuss the authorities supporting
the divergent views.
The dissenting justices very strongly assertbd that prior to the decision of
the case at bar they were not aware that any such "federal supervisory power
over federal law agencies" existed. The dissent stated further that this so-called
supervisory power was lodged in the executive branch of the government and
not in the judiciary and also asserted that the injunction did operate to stultify
the state prosecution and did so as effectively as if it had been issued directly
against the New Mexico officials.
Great emphasis was placed on the case of Steifanilli v. Minard' by the dissent,
in the case reviewed, as standing for the proposition that the federal government

8. 350 U.S. 214, 216 (1956).
9. 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
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would not interfere with the state proceedings and that the present case is a
departure from the Stefanilli case. However, as was pointed out in the dissenting opinion, there is one big difference in the Stefanilli case and the case at
bar, that being that the evidence which was illegally obtained in the former was
so obtained by New Jersey officials and not by federal agents. Stefanilli petitioned
the federal district court to enjoin the use of this evidence illegally seized but
made no attempt to suppress it in the New Jersey courts because, despite its being
illegally obtained, it was still admissible under the New Jersey law. The theory
of the petitioner, Stefanilli, was that the decision of Wolf v. People of State of
Colorado"° should be invoked. The precise holding of that case was'that in a
state prosecution for a state crime the fourteenth amendment does not forbid the
admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. But it
went on to say that the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
police-which is the core of the fourth amendment-is basic to a free society,
therefore it is implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such entitled
to be enforced against the states through the due process clause. The Wolf
decision stated further that were a state affirmatively to sanction such police
intrusion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the fourteenth
amendment.
Arguing from this language, Stefanilli asserted that the fourteenth amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures by the states, and that such a
search and seizure by the New Jersey state police subjected him to a deprivation
of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the constitution for which
redress is afforded." However, the United States Supreme Court held that the
federal courts should refuse to intervene in state criminal proceedings to suppress
the use of evidence even when claimed to have been seized by unlawful search and
seizure. This was referred to as the power of the federal court (or any court with
equity jurisdiction) to exercise discretion in the exercise of its equitable powers.
This is the first case which has suggested that the federal government has this
so-called supervisory power which is really founded upon an equitable power
that requires the exercise of discretion in its application. The majority put
great emphasis upon the special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved
between federal equitable power and state administration of its own law. The
importance of this separation of authority was pointed up by the historic concern
of the legislative branch of the federal government through congressional enactment. 2 The United States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stone in
Douglas v. City of Jeannette," said:

10. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
11. REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342, 2283, 2284 (5); 28 U.S.O.A. §§ 1341, 1342, 2283,
2284(5); see also Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Missouri Pacific
R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935);
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Maryland v. Super (No. 1) 270 U.S. 9
(1926) ; Maryland v. Soper (No. 2), 270 U.S. 36 (1926).
13. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
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Congress, by its legislation, has adopted the policy, with certain well
defined statutory exceptions, of leaving generally to the state courts the
trial of criminal cases arising under state laws, subject to review by this
court of any federal questions involved. Hence, courts of equity in the
exercise of their discretionary powers should conform to this policy by
refusing to interfere with or embarrass threatened proceedings in state
courts save in those exceptional cases which call for the interposition of a
court of equity to prevent irreparable injury which is clear and
imminent."'
The majority, in the case at bar, cited McNabb v. United States"' as the
basis from which stems this "supervisory power over the federal law agencies."
The dissent said that this case did not stand for such a proposition. Consequently
this case should bear closer scrutiny. The case entailed the question of evidence
obtained under questionable procedure and its admissibility."0 Without that
evidence the federal authorities had no case. The United States Supreme Court
held that the evidence so obtained was inadmissible.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority in the McNabb case, said:
Judicial supervisionY' of the administration of criminal justice in the
federal courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfied
merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing
trial by reason which are summarized as "Due process of law" and below
which we reach what is really trial by force. Moreover, review by this
court of state action expressing its notion of what will best further its
own security in the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate respect for the deliberative judgment of a state in so basic an
exercise of its jurisdiction. 8
Even though Justice Frankfurter mentions the judicial supervision over federal
criminal justice he still recognized the need for giving respect to the state exercise of jurisdiction. However, Justice Frankfurter continues to say:
The principles governing the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal
trials have not been restricted, therefore, to those derived solely from the
Constitution. In the exercise of its supervisory authority"' over the
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts . . ., this court
has from the very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence
to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions.2'

14. Id. at 163.
15. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
16. The federal authorities had received information that the McNabb brothers,
a clan of illiterate Tennessean mountaineers, were going to sell "moonshine"
whiskey one night. A trap was set for them which resulted in one of the federal
agents being killed. The McNabb brothers were arrested and taken to the
Federal Building in Chattanooga, Tenn., and were not brought before a judge
or commissioner. They were placed in a detention room and questioned for about
fourteen hours continuously by six officers. They were kept in ex communicado
and the questioning continued for approximately two days until finally admissions
were made by the McNabb brothers.
17. Italics are those of author.
18. 318 U.S. 332 at p. 340.
19. Italics are those of the author.
20. 318 U.S. 332, at p. 341.
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Still later Justice Frankfurter says in substance that the court, in holding
the admissions of the McNabb brothers inadmissible, confine themselves to their
limited function as the court of ultimate review2' of the standards formulated and
applied by federal courts in the trial of criminal cases. He said that their concern
was that a decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of justice and
custodians of liberty forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence secured
under illegal means.
There appears to be some confusion from the language chosen by Justice
Frankfurter in his opinon for the majority in the McNabb case. Though it isn't
clear what was the basis of the decision of the majority, it is certainly possible
that the court meant to assert a supervisory power and thereby control the
federal law agencies, as early in the opinion Justice Frankfurter twice makes
reference to the judicial supervisory power and the duty of the federal court in
curtailing the federal law agencies so as to maintain standards of procedure.
From whence such supervisory power is derived is not stated too clearly but it
certainly received a great amount of emphasis as the possible basis upon which
the McNabb case was decided, if it was not in fact the actual basis upon which
the case was decided. It is arguable that the basis for the majority opinion in
the McNabb case was not a "supervisory power" but that the admissions obtained
from the McNabb brothers were involuntary and thus were not admissible because of the violation of the fourteenth amendment. The dissenting justices in
the case were concerned with this, as they pointed out that the decision did not
state whether the admissions were voluntary or involuntary.
In the case at bar the Civil Rights Act was not mentioned but it might be
worth while to consider it in connection with this suggested supervisory power
and see what effect, if any, it has upon the problem. The Civil Rights Act 22 was
in issue in the case of Screws v. United States." The facts of that case are not
important for our purposes, but it does support the idea that the Civil Rights
Act should be so construed so as to respect the proper balance between the
states and the federal government in law enforcement. Justice Douglas, in the
Screws case, said that our national government is one of delegated powers alone
and under our federal system the administration of criminal justice rests with

21. Civil Rights Act §2, 14 STAT. 27 (1866): "That any person who, under
color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause
to be subjected, any inhabitant of any state or Territory to the deprivation of any
right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or
penalities on account of such person having at any time been held in a condition
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is
prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdeameanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
22. Italics those of author.
23. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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the states except as Congress has created offenses against the United States. It
is only state action of a particular character that is prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment and against which the amendment authorized congress to afford
relief.
Throughout the cases reviewed in this comment the idea of "laissez faire"
is existent with regard to the federal government interfering with the state
officials in their criminal prosecutions, yet for some reason the majority in the
case at bar felt compelled to exercise their discretion and enjoin the federal
agent from testifying in the case in the New Mexico court. The cases reviewed
bear out the power of the federal courts to exercise equitable power but likewise
they show a marked trend toward the court's exercising discretion in refusing
to act when their actions would directly or indirectly interfere with a state's
criminal procedure, i.e. the court in most all of the cases reviewed have applied
a "hands-off" doctrine where possible. It appears to the author that, after close
scrutiny, it is hard to find in the McNabb case the basis of this supervisory
power. It is clear enough that this power is mentioned in the McNabb case but
its origin is not stated therein.
The real question presented by the case at bar is whether the decision changes
the policy of the federal courts, i.e. whether the federal courts are no longer going
to apply a "hands-off" policy with reference to the state criminal prosecution,
but are going to keep a controlling hand on state court agencies through their
control over the federal law agencies. If this case sets a precedent, then the
states may well expect a limited curtailment of the freedom to which they have
heretofore been accustomed. Although this is within the realm of possibility,
the writer feels that the United States Supreme Court was compelled to decide
the present case as it did upon these particular facts and that a new and different
policy as heretofore seen has not been formulated by this decision.
JERRY S. ESTS

PUBLIC POLICY

AND THE;

E-TRICTED COVENANT PREVENTING TEE USE

OF

LAND Fop. BusINEss PURPOSES
Missouri has taken the position that, generally speaking, restrictions in
derogation of the fee are not favored.' However, restraints against the use of
land for business purposes are generally upheld where the object of the restriction

1. Mathews Real Estate Co. v. National Printing & Engraving Co., 330 Mo.
190, 48 S.W.2d 911 (1932); Dean v. Monteil, 361 Mo. 1204, 1209, 239 S.W.2d 337,
340 (1951): "Since restrictions on the use of land are repugnant to trade and
commerce, contrary to the well recognized business policy of the country, and
in derogation of common law, negative easements or conditions, or covenants or
limitations, restricting the use of property, are not favored in law." 26 C.J.S.,
Deeds, p. 508, § 162b (cited in Dean v. Monteil).
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is to create a wholesome residential district.' The fact that the property has
become more suitable for business purposes rather than for residential purposes
is not in itself ground for nullifying a covenant restricting the use of the property
to dwellings.'
The problem presented here is the extent to which either party to a deed, or
their successors in title, is bound to the terms of a restrictive covenant restraining either the land granted or the land retained from any use which would compete
with the use made of the land benefited by the covenant.'
In Shepherd v. Spurgeon,' the Missouri Supreme Court held that a covenant
in a deed to a 300-acre farm prohibiting the use of the land for any business
purposes whatsoever was void on the grounds that it tended to create a monopoly;
was in general restraint of trade; and was contrary to public policy.
In the Shepherd case, the facts were as follows. Prior to 1941 the land was
held by Reeves and his wife. On September 4, 1941, they conveyed the land to
Shepherd by warranty deed, reserving to themselves, their heirs and assigns,
"the right to the possession, use, income, and benefit" of a one-acre plot "for a
term of one hundred years, with full right to alienate and convey the same."
The deed further recited that, "As part of the consideration hereof it is agreed
that no building, booth, or enclosure within the lands herein conveyed shall ever
be used for business purposes, and none shall be erected or leased for such purposes."
The 300-acre farm lies in Schuyler County, Missouri. Its north line is approximately one mile in length and is parallel with the boundary line between the
states of Missouri and Iowa. The northern boundary of the farm is separated
from Iowa by a public highway, called the Iowa Line Road, running east and
west and serving rural communities lying east and west of the farm. U.S. Highway
6a is the principal north-south highway in Schuyler County and divides the farm

2. This note deals with only a single facet of the restrictive covenant problem,
viz, where the covenant restrains the use of the land in such a way as to actually
or potentially restrain trade, or create in one of the parties a monopoly, or both,
with the express or implied purpose of preventing competition.
The cases dealing with restrictive covenants contained in a deed are often cited
as authority in cases dealing with restrictive covenants in such varied situations
as employment contracts, the sale of chattels, or the sale of businesses. The
reverse is often true. There is no satisfactory heading in the digests under
which all the cases are grouped for easy access. (See note 7, infra) It is the
purpose here not to discuss the cases with a view to discovering or commenting
upon some new or novel rule of law-in fact the rules relied on by the courts seem
generally to be the same-but rather to lay before the reader a cross-section of
the cases so that he can draw his own conclusions as to the factual elements
which prompted the courts in giving situations to declare the covenant reasonable
or unreasonable.
3. Andrews v. Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 349 Mdo. 927, 163 S.W.2d 1024 (1942).
4. Reed v. Hazard, 187 Mo. App. 547, 174 S.W. 11 (1915).
5. 291 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1956).
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into two parcels so that approximately one-fourth of the tract, having a frontage
of one-fourth of a mile, lies on the west side of the highway, and three-fourths,
having a frontage of three-fourths of a mile, lie on the east side.
The one-acre plot, which Reeves reserved to himself in the deed, lies in
the northeast corner of the southwest quadrant formd by the intersection of
U.S. Highway 63 and the Iowa Line Road. The farm lies miles from any town
in a territory devoted to agricultural pursuits, and the only nearby buildings are
farm buildings. On the one-acre plot Reeves had a frame building in which he
engaged in selling 3.2 per cent beer and operating a filling station, restaurant,
and neighborhood grocery store.
Subsequent to his conveyance to Shepherd, Reeves conveyed the one-acre
plot to Spurgeon. Spurgeon improved the property by tearing down the frame
building and erecting a larger building from which he has engaged in operating
a filling station, restaurant and public dance hall, and from which building he
sells at retail groceries including oleomargarine, cigarettes, 3.2 per cent beer,
fireworks, gasoline, oil, and automobile accessories. Due to the strategic location
of the business, it attracted not only the local farmers and tourists, but also the
citizens of Iowa, who found it convenient to drive down to Missouri to purchase
certain commodities which were either prohibited or heavily taxed in Iowa.'
Shepherd realized that a valuable business was being operated on his farm,
and in an attempt to share in it he began this suit to try title to determine whether
the balance of the farm was effectively restricted. The court held that the
covenant contained in the deed from Reeves to Shepherd was void as it tended to
create a monopoly, was in general restraint of trade, and was contrary to public
policy.
The Shepherd case is the latest decision by the Missouri Supreme Court on
the question of the validity of restrictive covenants where their effect is to operate
on the land in such a way as to restrain competition. However, it does not stand
alone. The earliest case, and the only other Missouri case precisely in point, is
Dean v. Monteil," decided five years previously.
In the Dean case Rumble owned a five-acre plot and a 75-acre tract separated
by U.S. Highway 69 running in a northeasterly-southwesterly direction. A development company owned the tract immediately north of the five-acre plot, and this
tract had been platted as a subdivision. However, no further improvements had
been made on this tract. The development company purchased the five-acre plot

6. Iowa imposes high license fees, taxes, and other statutory regulations
on the sale and consumption of oleomargarine, cigarettes, fireworks, beer, and
gasoline. See 291 S.W.2d 162, at p. 163 (1956), cited in note 5, supra.
7. 361 Mo. 1204, 239 S.W.2d 337 (1951). Although there are some differences
in the facts of the Dean case and the Shepherd case, supr, the holdings are
practically identical; nevertheless the Dean case is digested under Covenants
while the Shepherd case is digested under Perpetuities.
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from Rumble. The deed contained certain restrictions as to roadhouses and the sale
of liquor, but was otherwise unrestricted as to businesses. The avowed purpose
of the development company was to secure the five-acre plot for the erection of
business buildings. At the same time, Rumble recorded an instrument restricting
the use of the north 35 acres of the 75-acre tract lying southeast of U.S. Highway
69 to residential purposes. Thereafter the plaintiff acquired the 75-acre tract
from Rumble, and the defendant acquired the five-acre plot at a bankruptcy
sale (the development company being bankrupt). This action was to declare
the instrument placing the restrictions on the 35-acre tract void as a cloud on
title.
The court held that the primary purpose of the restrictions on the 35-acre
tract was not to create a residential district, but was to restrict the use of the
land so as to prevent its use in competition with the five-acre plot. The tendency
of the restriction was to create a monopoly, and before such a restriction should be
upheld it should clearly appear that no monopoly is created by it.
Some seventy years ago the Virginia court had occasion to consider much the
same problem as arises in both the Shepherd and the Dean cases, and its decision
was followed by the Missouri court. In Tardy v. Creasy,8 the grantor conveyed
five acres of land at the junction of two railroads, retaining the surrounding 368
acres. The deed contained a covenant whereby the grantee "was to have the
exclusive mercantile privilege, and all rights pertaining thereto, at, in, and
around said junction," and the grantor agreed to forfeit $500 for any breach by
him. In a subsequent warranty deed, made for the purpose of more fully perfecting the intention of the parties, the grantor gave the grantee the exclusive
right to sell wares, goods and merchandise; to keep houses of public entertainment or refreshment; to establish warehouses, factories, foundries and shops
on said tract of five and one-half acres, or on any lands or lots subsequently
purchased by the grantee or on any part of the lands now owned by the grantor
at or adjoining said five and one-half-acre tract.
The grantor (Tolbert) then conveyed one acre of the 368-acre tract to Roach
by a general warranty deed, "restricting, however, the said Roach from any
mercantile privileges, the same having been heretofore conveyed to A. H. Tardy"
(the grantee), Roach then conveyed by general warranty deed, without mention
of the restrictions, to Creasy. Creasy established a mercantile business on the
land. Tardy then filed this suit to enjoin Creasy from "selling goods, wares, and
merchandise on said parcel of one acre of land, or from otherwise trespassing"
on the alleged rights of Tardy.
The court held that the covenant was not merely in partial restraint of
trade, for while it was only on one piece of land, it embraced all businesses which

8. 81 Va. 553, 59 Am. Rep. 676 (1886).
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could be carried on. As the covenant was in general restraint of trade, it was
void as against public policy.'
In Norcrossv. James, 0 the Massachusetts court refused an injunction against
violation of a restrictive covenant contained in a deed under the following circumstances. The grantor conveyed to the grantee a six acre quarry, bounded by
other land of the grantor, with a covenant in the deed whereby the grantor
promised on behalf of himself, his heirs and assigns that, "I will not open or work,
or allow any person or persons to open or work, any quarry or quarries on my
farm. . ." The plaintiff acquired title through the grantee, and the defendant
acquired title through the grantor. The defendant opened a quarry on his land,
and the plaintiff instituted a suit in equity to enjoin him from so doing under the
terms of the covenant. The court in denying relief held that this covenant did
not run with the land; that it merely tended indirectly to increase the value of
the plaintiff's quarry by excluding a competitor from the market for its products;
and while this could have been done had plaintiff owned the whole tract, it does
not follow that it could be done under a covenant of this type. Although the court
refused relief, it did not expressly hold that the covenant was invalid.
In Brewer v. Marshalland Cheeseman,1 the New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals refused an injunction to restrain the sale of marl from the premises
covered by a restrictive covenant. Cheeseman, the owner of a farm rich in marl,
conveyed a part of it to Lamb. The deed contained a covenant reading as follows:
"Also the said George Cheeseman, his heirs and assigns, are not to sell any
marl, by the rood or quantity, from off his premises adjoining the above property."
Lamb subsequently conveyed his land to Brewer. Marshall acquired title to part
of the farm from Cheeseman. Both Cheeseman and Marshall violated the covenant,
and Brewer sought an injunction. The court refused to grant relief, among
other reasons, on the ground that the covenant upon which the suit rested was
illegal in itself, and absolutely void. However, it should be noted that the court
construed the covenant as not being a restriction upon the use of the land, but
upon the sale of the marl after it had been dug up. The covenant was held
to be in restraint of trade, and all general restraints of trade are illegal. In this
case the court found that the restraint was general as to time, place and persons.l'

9. Two judges dissented. Since Greasy purchased the land with notice of
the covenant, it was their opinion that he should not be allowed to use the land
to the damage of Tardy. They did not think that the covenant was illegal on the
ground that it was in restraint of trade, since it was not general, but related to
certain enumerated privileges on a particular parcel of land, and was, therefore,
reasonable.
10. 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885).
11. 19 N.J. Eq. 537, 97 Am. Dec. 679 (1863).
12. Brewer was also seised of a second tract of land under a covenant similar
to that mentioned above, except that it was limited to thirty years. The court
expressed no opinion as to the validity of this covenant since no marl had been
taken off of this land by Brewer.
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West Virginia Transportation Co. v.

Ohio River Pipe Line Co.,'" the

owners of a 2000-acre tract in an oil producing territory granted the plaintiff
"the exclusive right of way and privilege to construct and maintain one or more
lines of tubing for the transportation of oil, water or other liquids along, through
and under lands owned by the undersigned. . ." The court held that plaintiff
should be denied an injunction against the defendant who was erecting a pipe
line on part of the original 2000-acre tract which he had acquired from the
original grantor. The covenant was held to be sufficient to grant a right of way
to the plaintiff, but the fact that it was an exclusive right of way would not bar
defendant from also constructing a pipe line, since in this respect the agreement
was inoperative, null and void as contrary to public policy, being an attempt
to impose an unreasonable restraint upon trade.
In Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Tremper," the company platted a village, inserting in the deeds of all lots sold the following clause: "This conveyance is
made upon the express condition that the said party of the second part, his heirs
and assigns or lessees, shall not, for the term of thirty years from and after
[the date of the conveyance] sell, give, or dispose of, in any way whatsoever,
upon said premises or any part thereof, intoxicating liquors or drinks of any
kind whatsoever. . ." The deed provided for forfeiture if the covenant was
breached. One Wyman, the secretary and manager of the corporation, testified
that this was for the benefit of the company in that it would keep the employees
from getting drunk and causing trouble. However, it appeared that the corporation allowed H. P. Wyman & Co. (any interest in which the corporation denied)
to sell liquor in the village. The company had conveyed a lot to Gales, who in
turn conveyed it to the defendant. Defendant operated a saloon on the premises,
and the company brought this action of ejectment. The court held that while
liquor is not a necessity like bread, it could see no reason why a monopoly on the
sale of liquor would be any more valid than a monopoly on the sale of bread. The
company had in effect restrained trade and created a monopoly in themselves,
and this monopoly was contrary to public policy.
The court did, however, recognize the fact that "the right to insert such a
condition as the one in this case, for an honest and beneficial purpose, cannot be
denied, and is within the public policy of this state." But it added that such conditions, inserted for a dishonest purpose and to the end that the grantor may
thereby obtain a monopoly in any business, and all others be restrained therefrom, would not be enforced by the court regardless of whether the business is
looked upon by the community with general favor or disfavor.
In Burdell v. Grandi,11 the plaintiff platted the town in much the same way
as in the Chippewa case. The deed contained a restrictive covenant with a for-

13. 22 W. Va. 600, 46 Am. Rep. 527 (1883).
14. 75 Mich. 36, 42 N.W. 532 (1889).
15. 152 Cal. 376, 92 Pac. 1022, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 909 (1907).
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feiture clause of the same general content as that in the Chippewa case, except
it provided that before liquor could be sold permission had to be obtained from
the plaintiff. Defendant violated the covenant, and plaintiff brought an action of
ejectment. The court held that the covenant was void as creating a monopoly in
the plaintiff and as against public policy. The court found that the plaintiff's
purpose was to reserve and create solely in himself a monopoly of the sale of
liquor within the town."
Many of the preceding cases were cited by the Missouri court in support of
its decision in either the Dean case or the Shepherd case."' Those which were not
cited could have been.
The result reached in the Shepherd case is, I think, correct. Since the covenant
attempted to prevent the use of the retained land for any business whatsoever,
it had the effect of virtual sterilization. Aside from the element of monopoly, this
in itself would be a sufficent violation of public policy to justify striking down the
covenant.
However, the case leaves an impression which might lead to an unjustifiable
conclusion, that is, that merely because the restraint may tend to create a monopoly
it-will be declared void as against public policy even though its disabling effects
are not so complete as they were in the Shepherd case. Suppose that the court
had construed the real but unexpressed intent of the covenant to have been only
to prevent competition on the retained land with the particular type of business
conducted on the one-acre tract. If this were the express or implied intent, the
question then becomes whether or not this would create a monopoly within the
meaning of that word as used in the Shepherd case. An affirmative argument
might be made from the general tenor of the case, especially in view of the fact
that the court cited the Chippewa case and the Burdell case. While these cases
involved this sort of a non-competitive covenant, it should be noticed that in each
case a whole town was restricted. Justification for the decision in both of these
cases can be found in that the area involved was unreasonably large. It is true
that the area restricted in the Shepherd case is probably greater than in either
the Chippewa case or the Burdell case. But when the location is taken into consideration, it is immediately apparent that the relative area restrained is far
less. In the Shepherd case (1) a similar business could conceivably have been
established either one-fourth or three-fourths of a mile south of the one-acre tract
(depending upon which side of U.S. Highway 63 one preferred); (2) the area is
farm land lying miles from the nearest town; and (3) the majority, if not all,
of the patrons of any business conducted in the area would drive there in an

16. This decision might well have been written by the Michigan court. The
only case cited is the Chippewa Lumber case, supra note 15, and it is extensively
quoted by the California court.
17. The Tardy case, the West Virginia Transportation Case, the Chippewa
Lumber Co. case, and the Burdell case were cited in either the Dean or the
Shepherd case.
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automobile so that the added inconvenience of driving an extra one-fourth or
three-fourths of a mile would be negligible. If the covenant in this case had been
more carefully drafted so as to restrain only competitive uses, I think the following
cases indicate that a conclusion contrary to that reached by the court might well
have prevailed.
In Hitchcock v. Anthony,11 Anthony was the lessee of a dock in the town of
Detour, Michigan, and was engaged in the coal and fish business. He sold land
adjacent to the dock to Hitchcock, Hitchcock promising not to engage in the coal
or fish business or do anything that will conflict with the coal and fish business
of Anthony for a term of seven years. The court recognized the transaction as
a means of preventing competition to Anthony, but held that it must be construed as restricting the use of this particular piece of land only, and did not bind
the promissor not to compete anywhere in the town of Detour. As to the land
covered by the transaction, the promise was valid and was not in general restraint
of trade.
In Dick v. Sears-Roebuck & Co.,1' the plaintiff, owner of a furniture business,
conveyed to the grantee the lot across the street. The grantee covenanted on behalf of himself, his heirs and assigns that he would not permit a retail or
wholesale furniture business to be established thereon for fifteen years. Defendant
came into possession of the land and violated the covenant. The court granted an
injunction restraining the defendant, holding that restriction on the conduct of
a certain business on a particular piece of land for reasonable purposes and
covering a reasonable period of time does not violate public policy.
In Lampson v. Caporale,2" plaintiff was engaged in the lumber business. He
owned the land adjacent to that upon which he conducted his business, and he
conveyed it to the defendant, the deed containing a restrictive covenant wherein
the grantee agreed not to use the described premises as a motor vehicle junk
yard, nor for the sale of used cars or parts, nor for any other occupation usually
deemed unwholesome, noxious or offensive, and "further, during such time as the
Grantor or its successors and assigns shall be engaged on the adjoining premises
now owned by it or any part thereof in the wholesale or retail lumber or building
materials business, Grantee and his heirs and assigns shall not engage in a business
that will compete or conflict therewith except that Grantee's engaging in the
business of tile and floor covering, including the stocking of medicine cabinets,
rubber tile, all kinds of floor covering, tile and tile fixtures, will not be in violation thereof." The defendant threatened to breach the covenant by manufacturing
windows. Plaintiff sued for an injunction, and the court granted relief. This,
said the court, was not a case of a contract between a vendor and vendee of a
business nor one between an employer and employee. This pertains to a transfer

18. 83 Fed. 779 (6th Cir. 1897).
19. 115 Conn. 122, 160 Ati. 432 (1932).
20. 140 Conn. 679, 102 A.2d 875 (1954).
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of property with a restriction, and "such covenants are usually sustained as being
reasonable even though they may prevent competition and even though they involve no transfer of good will." The restraint on real property is less likely to
affect public interest adversely than a restraint on the activities of an individual,
but it must, to be within public policy, not be an unreasonable restraint. Plaintiff would not have sold the premises, thought the court, if the restriction had not
been included, and it was fair to assume that the price of the property was affected
thereby. Here it would be inequitable to allow the defendant to have the property
free of the restriction. The covenant does not give any unfair protection to the
plaintiff, since it is limited (by the court's construction) to the land conveyed by
him, and does not unduly interfere with the interests of the public. "It is, therefore, not against public policy."
In Langenbacc v. Mays, 1 Mays conveyed to Langenback a small tract of
land upon which were situated some tourist cabins. As a part of the transaction,
Mays orally agreed that he would not use his remaining 168 acres lying adjacent
to the tract conveyed for competitive tourist camp purposes, so that the only
tourist camp in the immediate vicinity would be the one purchased by Langenback.
Subsequently Mays built and began operating a tourist camp. Langenback
brought suit, and -Mays was permanently restrained. Mays thereupon leased the
tourist cabins to his daughter who began operating them. Langenback again
sued, and the trial court held that the daughter had the right to operate the cabins.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the agreement was a "valid,
binding, and enforceable restrictive covenant made by them [Mays] respecting a
prohibited use of their property which equity would enforce."
In Natural Products Co. v. Dolese & Shepard Co.," the grantor, engaged in
the limestone quarrying, crushing, and selling business, conveyed part of its
land to the grantee, who operated a nursery. The deed contained a restrictive
covenant providing that no part of the estate conveyed nor the stone thereof should
ever be used for the purpose of producing crushed stone. The grantee then formed
a corporation under the name of Natural Products Co. and deeded that land to it
without the restriction. The newly formed corporation then brought this suit to
remove the covenant as a cloud on the corporation's title, basing their suit on the
ground that the covenant was null and void in law and equity as against public
policy. The court found that this was a valid covenant running with the land and
not void as against public policy, there being neither public interest nor public
necessity for such construction of the covenant since the supply of limestone in
Illinois was practically inexhaustable.
In Hodge v. Sloan," one Null owned 40 acres of land containing sand. Sloan
wanted to buy one-half acre of this land, but Null would not sell, because he

21. 207 Ga. 156, 60 S.E.2d 240 (1950).
22. 309 Ill. 230, 140 N.E. 840 (1923).
23. 107 N.Y. 244, 17 N.E. 335 (1887).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

15

1957]

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1957], Art. 3
COMMENTS

feared it would hurt his business.

However, after further negotiations, Null

finally did sell the one-half acre to Sloan, and a warranty deed was given
which contained a covenant by the grantee "not to sell any sand off of said
premises." Sloan later conveyed to the defendant by deed containing no reference
to the covenant in the deed from the plaintiff (Null). The covenant was violated.
The court found that there was nothing in this covenant which violated any
rule of public policy, and added, "Assuming, with the respondent, that the
covenant is in restraint of trade, it is still valid if it imposes no restriction upon
one party which is not beneficial to the other, and was induced by a consideration
which made it reasonable for the parties to enter into it. .. "
The court felt that since Sloan was not a dealer in sand and wished to
purchase the land on the best terms to him, there was no reason why it should
hold that the covenant was void. There were two dissenting judges who felt that
the covenant was a personal one and therefore should not bind the subsequent
grantee.
If the Missouri court were faced with a restriction where the time was
reasonable and the covenant limited to a specific enterprise, the court might
follow this last group of cases and hold the restriction valid, finding no violation
of public policy. Perhaps the doctrine of the Shepherd case will be limited to
those instances where the breadth of the restraint in effect dries out the land
commercially. If so, the argument might very well prevail that a careful distinction should be made between a covenant which prevents a person from carrying
on any business (except in the case of a residential area type of restriction)
and a covenant which prevents a particular piece of land from being used to carry
on a particular business, there being within the area other land not so restrained.
It is submitted that such a set of circumstances, while technically tending to
create a monopoly, would not create such a restraint as to confound trade and
commerce, nor such a monopoly as to offend the public policy of the state.
Louis F. CoTTEY
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